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No. 3240.
IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
OCTOBER TERM, 1918.

F.

L. BYRON AND CHARLES S. AUSTIN,
RESPONDENTS,

vs.
UTAH COPPER COMPANY, A CoRPORATION,
APPELLANT,
AND
JOHN KNUDSON AND GEORGE C. EARL,
DEFENDANTS,
AND
STEPHEN HAYS, IMPLEADED AS AN ADDITIONAL
DEFENDANT, RESPONDENT.
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

Hon. George F. Goodwin, Judge.
REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT.

Counsel say that the omission to bring up a bill
of exceptions was for reasons "best known to appellants." Obviously, the reasons for the omission cannot
affect the judgment of this court either the one way
or the other. But justice and a sense of fairness
in repelling the insinuation that such a bill might have
been unfavorable, demands that it be stated that the
omission was attributable to a misunderstanding between counsel, whereunder the time to file the bill
was inadvertently permitted to expire.

It is true that the deed itself is not in the record,
nor is the lease. But its exact terms quoted in our
main brief are in the identical language of the court's
findings of fact.
Our statements of fact are limited to the court's
finding. Where we mentioned a fact, we referred to
every page of the record where it was touched upon,
whether in the pleadings, the opinion, or the findings;
but in each instance the statement of fact is limited
to the finding of fact.

Counsel devote much of their brief to asserting
a presumption that the findings were borne out by
the evidence. No such question is presented here.
The finding that Hays was the "owner," etc., was
not a finding of the ultimate fact in the sense that
such expressions were used in the cases cited by
counsel.
There can be no assumption that there was some
other warranty deed from the Copper Company to
Hays. No such deed is mentioned in the findings. It
would not have been admissible under the pleadings.
The complaint asserted that Hays owned the ore simply
and solely by virtue of the reservation in his deed.
That is all the court found. That is all the court could
have found under the pleadings. To cast about for
an excuse to defeat justice in this case upon any such
unwarranted assumption as is suggested, is not worthy
of the effort of a court of conscience.
We may say the same thing as to the assumption
that the deed may have contained provisions other
than those recited in the complaint and found by the
court. A decision predicated upon such an idea would
be pitiful. It is just such strained ideas that have
brought reproach upon some courts and the legal profession. It converts a litigation from an investigation
of truth into a mere game.
Respectfully submitted,

DICKSON, ELLIS & LUCAS,
L. F. ADAMSON,
Attorneys for Appellant.

